网上找了半天皮浪,就找了这么点点属于皮浪有东西,可是比老庄还要吝啬呢!
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“它既不是这样的,也不是那样的,也不是这样和那样的”
“没有任何事物是美的或丑的,正当的或不正当的,这只是相对于判断而言。没有任何事物真正是这样的,只是人们按照风俗习惯来进行一切活动。每一件行为都既不能说是这样的,也不能说是那样的”
“没有一件事情可以固定下来当作教训,因为我们对任何一个命题都可以说出相反的命题来”
“最高的善就是不作任何判断,随着这种态度而来的就是灵魂的安宁,就像影子随着形体一样”
“我下功夫做一个诚实的人”
---以上是皮浪留存的极少数的言论。
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皮浪是怀疑论的始祖,没有任何一个哲学家,本质上不是一个皮浪主义者。
皮浪的学说,用现在的话来说,就是“存疑”、“悬搁”;现代哲学史家用这些词汇来养家糊口。
我们对事物的看法总是主观的,对事物的本性我们一无所知。我们永远不能说“那是如此”,而只能说“在我看来,那是如此”;
不论是谁,只要他否认认识事物的可能性,就不会把一个事物看得比另一个事物更高。
他的唯一目的,将是要求获得高尚的气质或美德。如果他要行动,他将依照机遇、自然、习惯和传统。
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关于皮浪的记载非常少,这是Compton's Interactive Encyclopedia里的一段生平记载:
Pyrrho (365?-275? BC),
1、Greek philosopher,
2、born in Elis;
3、traveled with Alexander the Great to India, where he studied with Indian philosophers;
4、came to believe that as thought and sensation often disagree, there is no actual way to determine truth;
5、founded school of skepticism in Elis
(linglei叹道:人一生,不过就是几件事)
罗素《西方哲学史》
怀疑主义之成为一种学派的学说最初是由皮浪提倡的,皮浪参加过亚历山大的军队,
并且随军远征过印度。看起来这使他发生了浓厚的旅行兴趣;他的余年是在他的故乡爱
里斯城度过的,公元前275年他死在这里。除了对于以往的各种怀疑加以一定的系统化与
形式化而外,他的学说里并没有多少新东西。对于感官的怀疑是从很早以来就一直在困
恼着希腊哲学家的;唯一的例外就是那些象巴门尼德和柏拉图那样否认知觉的认识价值
的人们,他们还把他们的否定当做是宣扬知识上的教条主义的一种好机会。智者们,特
别是普罗泰戈拉和高尔吉亚,曾经被感官知觉的模糊极其显著的矛盾而引到了一种有似
于休谟的主观主义。皮浪似乎(因为他很聪明地没有写过任何书)在对感官的怀疑主义
之外,又加上了道德的与逻辑的怀疑主义。据说他主张绝不可能有任何合理的理由,使
人去选择某一种行为途径而不选择另外的一种。在实践上,这就意味着一个人无论住在
哪个国家里,都是顺从着那里的风俗的。一个近代的信徒会在礼拜日到教堂去,并且奉
行正确的跪拜仪式,而不必具有任何被人认为是足以激发这些行动的宗教信仰。古代的
怀疑主义者奉行着全套的异教宗教仪节,有时候甚至于他们本人就是祭司;他们的怀疑
主义向他们保证了这种行为不可能被证明是错误的,而他们的常识感(这种常识感比他
们的哲学更经久)又向他们保证了这样做是便当的。
- posted on 04/26/2004
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/p/pyrrho.htm
Pyrrho (c. 360-c.270 BCE.)
Pyrrho was a Greek philosopher from Elea, and founder of the Greek school of skepticism. In his youth he practiced the art of painting, but passed over this for philosophy. He studied the writings of Democritus, became a disciple of Bryson, the son of Stilpo, and later a disciple of Anaxarchus. He took part in the Indian expedition of Alexander the Great, and met with philosophers of the Indus region. Back in Greece he was frustrated with the assertions of the Dogmatists (those who claimed to possess knowledge), and founded a new school in which he taught that every object of human knowledge involves uncertainty. Thus, he argued, it is impossible ever to arrive at the knowledge of truth (Diog. Laert, 58). It is related that he acted on his own principles, and carried his skepticism to such an extreme, that his friends were obliged to accompany him wherever he went, so he might not be run over by carriages or fall down precipices. It is likely, though, that these reports were invented by the Dogmatists whom he opposed. He spent a great part of his life in solitude, and was undisturbed by fear, or joy, or grief. He withstood bodily pain, and when in danger showed no sign of apprehension. In disputes he was known for his subtlety. Epicurus, though no friend to skepticism, admired Pyrrho because he recommended and practiced the kind of self-control that fostered tranquillity; this, for Epicurus, was the end of all physical and moral science. Pyrrho was so highly valued by his countrymen that they honored him with the office of chief priest and, out of respect for him, passed a decree by which all philosophers were made immune from taxation. He was an admirer of poets, particularly Homer, and frequently cited passages from his poems. After his death, the Athenians honored his memory with a statue, and a monument to him was erected in his own country.
Pyrrho left no writings, and we owe our knowledge of his thoughts to his disciple Timon of Phlius. His philosophy, in common with all post-Aristotelian systems, is purely practical in its outlook. Skepticism is not posited on account of its speculative interest, but only because Pyrrho sees in it the road to happiness, and the escape from the calamities of life. The proper course of the sage, said Pyrrho, is to ask himself three questions. Firstly we must ask what things are and how they are constituted. Secondly, we ask how we are related to these things. Thirdly, we ask what ought to be our attitude towards them. As to what things are, we can only answer that we know nothing. We only know how things appear to us, but of their inner substance we are ignorant. The same thing appears differently to different people, and therefore it is impossible to know which opinion is right. The diversity of opinion among the wise, as well as among the vulgar, proves this. To every assertion the contradictory assertion can be opposed with equally good grounds, and whatever my opinion, the contrary opinion is believed by somebody else who is quite as clever and competent to judge as I am. Opinion we may have, but certainty and knowledge are impossible. Hence our attitude to things (the third question), ought to be complete suspense of judgment. We can be certain of nothing, not even of the most trivial assertions. Therefore we ought never to make any positive statements on any subject. And the Pyrrhonists were careful to import an element of doubt even into the most trifling assertions which they might make in the course of their daily life. They did not say, "it is so," but "it seems so," or "it appears so to me." Every observation would be prefixed with a "perhaps," or "it may be."
This absence of certainty applies as much to practical as to theoretical matters. Nothing is in itself true or false. It only appears so. In the same way, nothing is in itself good or evil. It is only opinion, custom, law, which makes it so. When the sage realizes this, he will cease to prefer one course of action to another, and the result will be apathy (ataraxia). All action is the result of preference, and preference is the belief that one thing is better than another. If I go to the north, it is because, for one reason or another, I believe that it is better than going to the south. Suppress this belief, learn that the one is not in reality better than the other, but only appears so, and one would go in no direction at all. Complete suppression of opinion would mean complete suppression of action, and it was at this that Pyrrho aimed. To have no opinions was the skeptical maxim, because in practice it meant apathy, total quietism. All action is founded on belief, and all belief is delusion, hence the absence of all activity is the ideal of the sage. In this apathy he will renounce all desires, for desire is the opinion that one thing is better than another. He will live in complete repose, in undisturbed tranquillity of soul, free from all delusions. Unhappiness is the result of not attaining what one desires, or of losing it when attained. The wise person, being free from desires, is free from unhappiness. He knows that, though people struggle and fight for what they desire, vainly supposing some things better than others, such activity is but a futile struggle about nothing, for all things are equally indifferent, and nothing matters. Between health and sickness, life and death, difference there is none. Yet insofar as we are compelled to act, we will follow probability, opinion, custom, and law, but without any belief in the essential validity or truth of these criteria. - posted on 04/26/2004
读完了让我想起我佛陀的思想体系,据说佛陀开悟后,花了很长时间在
寻思:说不说?怎样说?
但终究还是说了,黄庭坚有一小偈:
法法本无法,
无法法亦法,
若付无法时,
法法何曾法。
不仅象偈子中如是说,还有所谓化城,壁喻,方便。。。真正象一部部
戏剧!
说了四十多年的法,最后又告弟子须菩提:“实无有法,发阿耨多罗三
藐三菩提心者。”,“ 亦无有定法,如来可说!” 于是有:
一切有为法,
如梦幻泡影,
如露亦如电,
应作如是观。
这法讲得比之与皮浪如何?
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